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Abstract. Advertising mechanisms for search engines (i.e., sponsored
search auctions) have recently received a lot of attention in the scientific
community. Advertisers bid on keywords and, when a user enters key-
words for her search, the search engines uses an auction mechanism to
select the list of sponsored links to display alongside the search results.
In this paper, we make a first attempt to extend the currently available
mechanisms for sponsored search auctions to the new paradigms of search
computing. According to them, multiple federated domain-specific search
engines are integrated by a special search engine (called integrator). The
user can enter a multi-domain query that is decomposed by the integra-
tor in single-domain queries and these are singularly addressed to the
most appropriate domain-specific search engine. The integrator merges
the search results. We propose a business model for this scenario and
we develop an economic mechanism for it resorting to the automated
mechanism design approach.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search auctions [1, 2] play a prominent role in Internet advertising,
generating more than 90% of the search engines’ revenues. A large number of
theoretical/practical works can be found in the very recent literature. Never-
theless, this market is still largely unexplored and a number of problems are
currently open. The functioning of sponsored search auctions is simple. When
a user enters keywords into a search engine, several sponsored links related to
the entered keywords are displayed alongside the search results, e.g., see [3]. The
search engine chooses the sponsored links to display and the ranking over them
by using an auction mechanism where the bidders are advertisers and the item
over which they bid are keywords. The payment scheme is the pay-per-click,
i.e., the advertiser pays the search engine only after a user has clicked on its
sponsored link.
The most employed auction mechanism in sponsored search auctions is the
generalized second price (from here on GSP) [4] that is an ad hoc extension of
the Vickrey auction (from here on VA) [2] to the setting where a set of ranked
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objects is being sold. In the VA, a winner pays the second highest bid, while, in
the GSP, each winner pays an amount equal to its next highest bid. However, as
shown in [4], in the GSP the truth telling strategy is not (generally) optimal for
the players, as instead it is in the VA. The exact generalization of the VA to the
above settings, satisfying the property that the truth-telling strategy is optimal,
is similar to the GSP except for the definition of the payments. Although this
last mechanism is strategy-proof and could assure a higher degree of the outcome
stability, it is not currently adopted in real-world applications.
The available economic mechanisms for sponsored search auctions effectively
work with the major general-purpose search engines. However, the recent ad-
vancements in the search computing field lead to the definition of novel searching
paradigms that rise new challenges and that require extensions of the available
auction mechanisms [5, 6]. The main general-purpose search engines crawl the
Web and index Web pages, finding the best pages for each specific list of keywords
with excellent precision. Anyway, the so-called “deep Web” contains information
that is more valuable than that contained in single Web pages and the current
general-purpose search engines are not able to discover it. The development
of new searching paradigms able to address more complex searches than those
addressed to the current search engines and to discover deeper information is
currently one of the most interesting challenges in the search computing field. In
particular, the emerging paradigm is based on the integration of heterogeneous
data sources. According to that, a special search engine (from here on integrator)
integrates the results produced by multiple domain-specific search engines, e.g.,
see [7]. The basic idea is the following. The user’s search is a multi-domain query.
Each multi-domain query is automatically decomposed by the integrator in mul-
tiple single-domain queries and each of them is addressed to the most appropriate
domain-specific search engine. Obviously, when a query addresses a specific do-
main, domain-specific search engines works better than general-purpose ones.
Once the integrator has received the search results from all the domain-specific
search engines, it aggregates them in a unique result. This is shown by using ad
hoc interfaces that allow the user to explore the search results, adding/removing
domains and thus refining the search itself, e.g., see [9].
The search computing field is working exclusively on the searching techniques
and is neglecting the business model behind the above scenario (e.g., what kind
of contracts will be drawn up between the integrator and the domain-specific
search engines?). Currently the commercial use of the search results produced
by a search engine is ruled by a contract between the search engine and the
publisher prescribing that the publisher must display the list of sponsored links
produced by the search engine, e.g., as in [10]. Once a user clicks on a sponsored
link, the search engine receives the payment from the corresponding advertiser
and gives part of it to the publisher. The payment ratio kept by the search
engine is defined by a commercial contract and it is independent of the specific
search. On the one hand, the basic idea behind this business model can be
“naturally” applied to the above scenario. On the other hand, the contracts
between the publisher (in our case the integrator) and the search engines (in
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our case the domain-specific search engines) must be reconsidered keeping into
account that each search engine plays a role in the search process. Our opinion
is that the contracts between the integrator and the search engines should be
drawn up dynamically, depending on the specific search and, in particular, on
the contribution provided by the specific search engine to the search.
In this paper we propose an economic mechanism [11] to rule the contracts
between the integrator and the domain-specific search engines. In our proposal,
the integrator receives the lists of sponsored links from the domain-specific search
engines and merges them in a unique list. In the merging process, the integrator
keeps into account the advertisers’ bids and click probabilities related to the list
of each domain-specific search engine in order to generate the list of sponsored
links that gives the largest expected utility. Being the information on the adver-
tisers’ bids and click probabilities private for each domain-specific search engine,
we must produce the appropriate incentives to the domain-specific search engines
not to misreport such a information. We formulate this problem as a single-stage
mechanism design problem [2] and we discuss the desired properties. We show
that the domain-specific search engines present interdependent valuations due
to the aggregation of their information. We study it by using the automated
mechanism design approach [12]. It provides a flexible tool to design mecha-
nisms on-the-fly and allows one to customize each problem by varying different
objective functions and adding/removing possible constraints over the contracts.
However, the hardness of solving an automated mechanism design problem al-
lows us to solve in exact way only small settings with a few of search engines
and advertisers. For large settings, approximate (anytime) algorithms can be
developed to produce a sub-optimal solutions by a given deadline.
Finally, we remark that the possibility to integrate multiple lists of sponsored
links provides, in our opinion, two advantages. First, the integrator can target
at best the advertisement to the user by exploiting multiple information sources
(i.e., the domain-specific search engines) and the user’s feedback during her
exploration of the search. Second, this paradigm allows domain-specific search
engines to federate together and to be real competitors to the major general-
purpose search engines. This could open new economic opportunities for online
advertising.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the
state of the art related to the sponsored search auctions, the multi-domain search
computing, and the automated mechanism design. In Section 3, we propose a
business model for the scenario we study, we formally state an economic mecha-
nism, we discuss the desired properties, and we formulate the problem of design-
ing the mechanism as an automated mechanism design problem. In Section 4,
we discuss some examples. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 State of the Art
We introduce a formal model of sponsored search auctions in Section 2.1, we
discuss the multi-domain search computing paradigm in Section 2.2, and we
survey the idea behind the automated mechanism design in Section 2.3.
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2.1 Sponsored Search Auctions
The formal model of a sponsored search auction is constituted by m items (i.e.,
the ranked set of slots for sponsored links given a specific keyword) sold by the
auctioneer (i.e., the search engine) and by a set of bidders (i.e., the advertisers)
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} where n ≥ m. Each advertiser can submit a bid constituted by
a value per click on the advertisement for a keyword. The bid is unique for all
the slots. Being the payment scheme pay-per-click, each advertiser pays nothing
if its sponsored link is displayed but not clicked by the user. Instead, in the case
the user clicks on the link, the advertiser is required to pay an amount of money
that is non-larger than its bid. The exact value of the payment is carried out by
the auction mechanism.
The search engine assigns to each bidder a click probability called click-
through-rate (from here on CTR) [2]. CTR depends on various factors including
the probability that users click on advertisement, the relevance of the bidders’
advertisement, and so on. Formally, we denote by αi,j the probability that the ad-
vertiser i’s sponsored link is clicked when it is displayed on the j-th highest slot.
Usually, these probabilities are supposed to be separable into two independent
components, where the first component refers only to the advertiser and the sec-
ond component refers only to the position of the slot. Formally, αi,j = αai · αrj
where αai is the probability that advertiser i is clicked independently of the
specific slot in which its sponsored link is displayed and αrj is the probability
assigned to the j-th highest slot independently of the specific advertiser. The
common assumption is that αr1 > αr2 > . . . > αrk . Currently, Google ranks the
advertisements by using a separable CTR.
The GSP auction extends the VA as follows. We call bi the bid submitted
by advertiser i. The auctioneer ranks the bids in decreasing order in the value
αai · bi. For the sake of simplicity suppose that, given αai and αah , if i < j, then
αai ·bi > αah ·bh. The advertiser with αa1 ·b1 will be displayed at the first slot, the
advertiser with αa2 · b2 will be displayed in the second slot, and so on. Once the
sponsored link displayed in the i-th position is clicked, the i-th advertiser pays
pi =
αai+1 ·bi+1
αai
to the search engine (while the other search engines’ payments
are zero).
2.2 Multi-Domain Search Computing
The new advancements produced in the field of the search computing are di-
rected to fill the gap between general purpose search engines and domain-specific
search engines. General purpose search engines work well in finding Web pages
related to the entered keywords, but are unable to find information spanning
multiple topics. Domain-specific search engines work well in finding structured
information spread on multiple Web pages related to a specific domain, but their
expertise is clearly limited to a given domain. An expert user can perform several
independent searches and then manually combine the results, but the missing
aspect is the ability of joining the results of each search process so as to build a
collective answer.
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The emerging search computing paradigm prescribes that a user can com-
pose her search as a multi-domain query and this is addressed to a federated
search platform. Each single-domain query is addressed to the most appropri-
ate domain-specific search engine. The search results produced by the domain-
specific search engines are merged by an integrator through syntactic and/or
semantic joint methods [13]. The merging of the search results is only the first
feature provided by the integrator. Indeed, this allows a user to explore the search
by changing modularly the dimensions of the multi-domain query. In particular,
a user can add or remove dimensions, can manipulate results via composition
and aggregation, and can reorder results [14].
Search results are shown through tables where the columns are the dimen-
sions and the rows are items of the search. In the cells of the tables, information
related to the specific item and dimension is reported. An example is Google
Squared [9]. The definition of a business model for federated search engines and
the integrator is currently an open problem.
2.3 Automated Mechanism Design
Classical mechanism design provides general mechanisms, satisfying some notion
of non-manipulability and maximizing some objective. The most famous general
mechanisms, VCG and dAGVA [2], only maximize social welfare. For almost all
the other social choice functions, there is no known mechanism that implements
them. For example, revenue-maximizing mechanisms are only known for very
restricted settings, such as the Myerson’s expected revenue maximizing auction
for selling a single item, and the Maskin and Riley’s expected revenue maxi-
mizing auction for selling multiple identical units of an item [2]. In practice, a
designer often has prior information over agents’ types and only needs to design
a mechanism suitable for her particular context. In the automated mechanism
design approach, a mechanism is designed automatically for the specific pref-
erence aggregation problem. The mechanism design problem can be formulated
as an optimization problem where the input is characterized by the number of
agents, the agents’ possible types (preferences), and the aggregator’s prior prob-
ability distributions over the agents’ types and the output is a non-manipulable
mechanism that is optimal with respect to some objective.
3 The Economic Mechanism
We propose a business model in Section 3.1 for multi-domain search computing
scenarios in which domain-specific search engines are federated, we formulate an
economic mechanism supporting our business model in Section 3.2, we discuss
the desired properties of our mechanism in Section 3.3, and we state the problem
of designing the social choice function and the payments in our mechanism as
an automated mechanism design problem in Section 3.4.
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3.1 The Proposed Business Model
The commercial use of the search results is currently ruled by a contract between
the search engine and the publisher prescribing that the publisher must display
the list of sponsored links alongside the search results, e.g., see [3]. If the user
clicks on a sponsored link, the corresponding advertiser pays the search engine
which, in its turn, gives a part of the revenue to the publisher. The ratio of
revenue kept by the search engine does not depend on the specific search and is
established by the contract. The values of the advertisers’ bids and the corre-
sponding click probabilities constitute private information of the search engine
and are hidden to the publisher.
This business model can be easily applied to the case in which an integrator
merges the search results of multiple search engines. The idea is:
– the integrator merges the lists of sponsored links returned by each single
domain-specific search engine,
– the payments from the domain-specific search engines to the integrator de-
pends on the specific search.
The crucial issue is the development of techniques that allows the integrator
to produce the list that maximizes a given objective function (e.g., the ex-
pected revenue of the integrator or the expected revenue of a combination of
specific-domain search engines). We propose an economic mechanism to govern
the merging of the lists where:
– the domain-specific search engines communicate to the integrator their pri-
vate information (values of the bids and click probabilities) concerning the
sponsored links related to their own list;
– the integrator produces an estimation of the click probability for each spon-
sored link as a function of the received click probabilities (e.g., averaging the
click probabilities of a sponsored link over the different search engines);
– the integrator selects the list of sponsored links in order to maximize a given
objective function (e.g., the integrator’s expected utility or the cumulative
expected utility) and produces the appropriate incentives (i.e., payments) for
each domain-specific search engine to make them not misreport their true
values;
– the integrator keeps into account how the user explores the search results in
estimating the click probabilities and produces a new list of sponsored links
every time the user add/remove domains.
In what follows, we formally state the economic mechanism.
3.2 The Formal Mechanism
We consider a direct mechanism [2]M(X,S,Θ, V, f, p) where the agents are the
domain-specific search engines (from here on we omit “domain-specific”) and
the integrator acts as auctioneer. We denote by X the set of alternatives. For
the sake of presentation, we formally define X below, after having defined S and
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Θ. We denote by S the set of search engines. We denote by A the overall set of
advertisers and by A(s) with s ∈ S the set of advertisers appearing in the list of
sponsored links of search engine s. Each advertiser a ∈ A(s) is characterized by
a bid b and a click probability α that are private information for search engine s.
The type θs ∈ Θs of search engine s specifies a value for b and a value for α for
all the advertisers a ∈ A(s). Set Θ is composed by all the sets Θss and θ denotes
the profile of search engines’ types. We assume that we have a probabilistic prior
over Θs and we can represent it as a set of independent probability distributions,
each over a specific advertiser a ∈ A(s). In particular, we denote by Θs,a the set
of possible types of advertiser a appearing in the list of sponsored links of search
engine s and we denote by θs,a ∈ Θs,a the type. We introduce the functions
b(θs,a) : Θs,a → R, returning the bid submitted by advertiser a to search engine
s related to type θs,a, and α(θs,a) : Θs,a → [0, 1], returning the click probability
of advertiser a in the sponsored link list of search engine s related to type θs,a.
Generally, an advertiser a can appear in the lists of more than one search engine
with different values of bid and click probability, i.e., b(θs,a) can be different from
b(θs′,a), as well as α(θs,a) can be different from α(θs′,a). We denote by ω(θs,a)
the probability that the actual type of advertiser a for search engine s is θs,a.
Therefore, the type of search engine s is a tuple specifying the type related to
each advertiser a ∈ A(s), e.g., θs = (θs,1, . . . , θs,|A(s)|). The probability ω(θs)
related to θs is defined as ω(θs) =
∏
θs,a∈θs ω(θs,a).
Now we focus on set X. An alternative x ∈ X specifies a winner for each slot
of the list of sponsored links displayed by the integrator. We assume that the
number of available slot is fix and it is equal to k. A winner is identified by a pair
(s, a), that is advertiser a related to the sponsored link list of search engine s.
This is because the same advertiser a ∈ A can appear in the sponsored link lists
of different search engines. We need to specify the search engine to which the
sponsored link belongs because such a search engine will be paid by the advertiser
and a may have submitted different bids to different search engines. Formally,
x = 〈(s, a), . . . , (s′, a′)〉, where the first element of x specifies the winner of the
first slot, the second element of x specifies the winner of the second slot, and so
on. The unique constraint is that a sponsored link can appear only in one slot,
that is, for all a and a′ appearing in x in different positions, we have a 6= a′.
We denote by V the set V = {vs : s ∈ S} where vs : X → R denotes the
valuation function of search engine s. Given x, if s does not appear in x, then
vs(x) = 0. Instead, if s appears in x, vs(x) returns the s’s expected valuation
over x defined as: for each (s, a) ∈ x, the s’s expected valuation is the product
between the a’s click probability and the valuation that s receives when the
a’s sponsored link is clicked. Before formally stating v(x), we focus on these
two elements. First, we consider the a’s click probability. It is a function of
α(θs′,a) for all s′ where θs′,as are the reported types. That is, the integrator
produces an estimation of such click probability, denoted by α(a), aggregating
the click probabilities over the advertiser a of all the search engines s such that
a ∈ A(s). In estimating α, the integrator can exploit several parameters, e.g.,
it can assign different weights to different search engines or excluding search
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engines, once the user has removed the corresponding dimension. In our work
we use a simple estimator: the average α(a) =
P
s∈S:a∈A(s) α(θs,a)
|A| . Second, we
consider the valuation that s receives when the a’s sponsored link is clicked. In
this work we assume that advertiser a pays to s exactly its bid. Essentially, we
assume a first-price approach. We make this assumption for simplicity because
we are focusing only on the interaction between the integrator and the search
engines. In future works, we shall consider also the interaction between the search
engines and the advertisers. Now, we are in the position to formally state vs(x)
as vs(x) =
∑
(s,a)∈x α(a) · b(θs,a) where θs,as are the true types of s.
In mechanism M, f and p define respectively the social choice function and
the search engines’ payments. More precisely, f is a function f : Θ → X that
given the type of all the search engines returns an alternative, while p : Θ →
Rk·|S|, where k is the number of slots, returns the payment for each search engine
for each situation in which one sponsored link is clicked. We use a quasi-linear
setting where the utility of a search engine is equal to the difference between its
valuation and the payment. We want to design f and p such that M satisfies a
set of properties.
3.3 Required Properties
Before discussing the properties we require that our mechanism satisfies, we
underline that, in the general case, search engines in mechanism M present
interdependent valuations [15, 16]. This is because vs(x) depends on α(a) that,
in its turn, depends on θs′,as for all s′. Exclusively when A(s)∩A(s′) = ∅ for all
s 6= s′, α(a) depends only on the type of the search engine s such that a ∈ A(s)
and therefore the search engines’ valuations are not interdependent. We require
the following properties.
(Ex-post) Individual rationality. For every x such that f(θ) = x, we require
that, for every realization of x, the utility of all the search engines is non-negative.
This requires that, given x, whenever a sponsored link a related to search engine
s is clicked, s does not pay the mechanism more than b(θs,a), while the payments
of all the other search engines s′s are non-positive.
(Ex-post Nash and Bayesian) Incentive compatibility. We require the imple-
mentation of f either in ex-post Nash or in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Therefore,
we require that each search engine reporting its true type is an optimal strategy.
(We use ex-post Nash implementation instead of dominant strategy implementa-
tion because in our problem valuations are interdependent. We recall that ex-post
Nash and dominant strategy implementations are always the same except when
the valuations are interdependent.)
(Ex-post) Weak budget balance. For every x such that f(θ) = x, we require
that, for every realization of x, the cumulative payments of the search engines is
non-negative. This requires that, given x, whenever a sponsored link a appearing
in the sponsored link list of search engine s is clicked, the sum of search engines’
payments excluded s is not smaller than −b(θs,a). The revenue of the integrator
is equal to the cumulative payments of the search engines.
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Optimality. We consider several objective functions: the maximization of the
ex-ante expected utility of the integrator (defined as the sum of the expected
payments of the search engines), the maximization of the ex-ante cumulative
expected valuations of the search engines, the maximization of the ex-ante cu-
mulative expected utilities of the search engines, and the maximization of the
ex-ante expected utility of a specific search engine. The choice of the objective
function depends on the specific contract.
We remark that in the general case (interdependent valuations) our mech-
anism cannot be efficient. Indeed, with interdependent valuations and multiple
signals a one-stage mechanism may not be incentive compatible and efficient [17]
(with two-step mechanism is instead possible to have efficient incentive compat-
ible mechanisms [16]; we shall explore this option in future works). It can be
easily shown that even in the basic case in which there are two search engines
and the same advertiser for both search engines, and only the click probabilities
are uncertain, a one-stage mechanism may not be incentive compatible and ef-
ficient. Indeed, in the case each player has a single signal, three conditions need
to be satisfied in order to make a mechanism incentive compatible and efficient,
see [17]. One of these requires that ∂vs∂θs >
∂vs′
∂θs
for all s, s′. Generally this condi-
tion is not satisfied in our basic case. As a result, f cannot be easily defined as
the argument maximizing the social welfare, as instead it is possible for efficient
mechanism.
3.4 The Automated Mechanism Design Formulation
We formulate our mechanism as an automated mechanism design [12] problem.
We represent f as a collection fs,a,θ,r ∈ {0, 1} where fs,a,θ,r = 1 means that
advertiser a related to search engine s is assigned position r when type profile
of the search engines is θ. Index r belongs to the range R = {1, . . . , k}. For
simplicity, for a ∈ A \ A(s) we set fs,a,θ,r = 0, b(θs,a) = 0, and ω(θs,a) = 0. We
introduce the constraints in a mathematical programming fashion. Initially, we
constrain every sponsored link a to appear at most in one position r:
X
r∈R
X
s∈S:a∈A(s)
fs,a,θ,r ≤ 1 ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀a ∈ A (1)
We constrain that for each position r there is exactly one sponsored link:
X
s∈S
X
a∈A
fs,a,θ,r = 1 ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀r ∈ R (2)
We denote by ps,θ,r the payment of the search engine s when the r-th sponsored
link is clicked and the type profile is θ. To make the mathematical programming
formulation easier, we divide ps,θ,r in payments concerning the single advertisers,
one for each of them. We denote these payments by ps,a,θ,r and we define ps,θ,r =∑
a∈A(s) ps,a,θ,r for all s ∈ S, θ ∈ Θ, and r ∈ R. The ex-post individual rationality
constraints make each search engine to pay no more than its valuation, formally,
we have:
ps,a,θ,r ≤ b(θs,a) · fs,a,θ,r
∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A(s),
∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀r ∈ R (3)
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We require further that, if the sponsored link of advertiser a is displayed at
the r-th position when the type profile is θ, then its payment is non-negative,
formally, we have:
ps,a,θ,r ≥ −M ·
0@1− X
a′∈A(s)
fs,a′,θ,r
1A ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A(s),
∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀r ∈ R (4)
where M is an arbitrarily large number. With abuse of notation we denote by
α(a, r) the probability that the integrator assigns to a when it is displayed at
the r-th position. We represent θ = (θs, θ−s) where θs is the type profile of
search engine s and θ−s is the type profile θ once excluded θs. The ex-post Nash
incentive compatibility constraints are:
X
r∈R
X
a∈A
“
b(θs,a) · fs,a,(θs,θ−s),r − ps,a,(θs,θ−s),r
”
· α¯(a, r) ≥
X
r∈R
X
a∈A
“
b(θs,a) · fs,a,(θ′s,θ−s),r − ps,a,(θ′s,θ−s),r
”
· α¯(a, r)
∀s ∈ S,
∀θ ∈ Θ,
∀θ′s ∈ Θs
(5)
The Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints are:
X
θ−s
X
r∈R
X
a∈A
 “
b(θs,a) · fs,a,(θs,θ−s),r−
−ps,a,(θs,θ−s),r) · α¯(a, r)
”
·
Y
s′∈S/{s}
ω(θs′ )
!
≥
X
θ−s
X
r∈R
X
a∈A
 “
b(θs,a) · fs,a,(θ′s,θ−s),r−
−ps,a,(θ′s,θ−s),r
”
· α¯(a, r)) ·
Y
s′∈S/{s}
ω(θs′ )
!
∀s ∈ S,
∀θs ∈ Θs,
∀θ′s ∈ Θs
(6)
The ex-ante weak budget balance constraints are:
X
s∈S
X
a∈A
ps,a,θ,r ≥ 0 ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∀r ∈ R (7)
In what follow we point out the possible objective functions for our model. The
maximization of the integrator’s ex-ante expected utility is:
max
X
θ∈Θ
0@X
r∈R
X
s∈S
X
a∈A
ps,a,θ,r · α(a, r)
1A · Y
θs∈θ
ω(θs,a) (8)
The maximization of the cumulative search engines’ ex-ante expected valuations
is:
max
X
θ∈Θ
0@X
r∈R
X
s∈S
X
a∈A
b(θs,a) · fs,a,θ,r · α¯(a, r)
1A · Y
θs∈θ
ω(θs,a) (9)
The maximization of the cumulative search engines’ ex-ante expected utility is:
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max
X
θ∈Θ
0@X
r∈R
X
s∈S
X
a∈A
“
b(θs,a) · fs,a,θ,r − ps,a,θ,r
”
· α¯(a, r)
1A · Y
θs∈θ
ω(θs,a) (10)
The maximization of the search engine s’s ex-ante expected utility is:
max
X
θ∈Θ
0@X
r∈R
X
a∈A
“
b(θs,a) · fs,a,θ,r − ps,a,θ,r
”
· α¯(a, r)
1A · Y
θs∈θ
ω(θs,a) (11)
It can be easily observed that all the above constraints and objective functions
are linear. That is, our formulation is linear mixed integer.
4 Some Examples
We briefly analyze in Section 4.1 the business model currently adopted by Ad-
Sense and we show an example of our mechanism in Section 4.2.
4.1 Single Search Engine Case
We consider the business model currently adopted by AdSense where a publisher
displays the search engine’s sponsored links alongside the search results and, if a
link is clicked, the search engine pays a fix ratio of its revenue to the publisher.
We study this situation with our framework by introducing a constraint over
the payment of the search engine to the publisher (in our case the integrator).
Formally, we need to impose that ps,a,θ,r = ρ·b(θs,a) with ρ ∈ [0, 1] if fs,a,θ,r = 1.
It can be easily shown that no incentive compatible mechanism can be designed
in general. Consider the following example.
We have a single search engine s and two possible advertisers. The types
related to the first advertiser are θs,1 ∈ {θ1s,1, θ2s,1, θ3s,1} with b(θ1s,1) = 0.4,
b(θ2s,1) = 0.5, b(θ
3
s,1) = 0.6, and α(θ
1
s,1) = α(θ
2
s,1) = α(θ
3
s,1) = 0.3. The types
related to the second advertiser are θs,2 ∈ {θ1s,2, θ2s,2, θ3s,2} with b(θ1s,2) = 0.5,
b(θ2s,2) = 0.6, b(θ
3
s,2) = 0.7, and α(θ
1
s,2) = α(θ
2
s,2) = α(θ
3
s,2) = 0.2. The probabili-
ties ω(·)s can be arbitrary. It can be shown that there is no incentive compatible
mechanism. Easily, when the true type of search engine s is (θ3s,1, θ
3
s,2), its op-
timal strategy is to report (θ1s,1, θ
1
s,2) independently of the implemented social
choice function and independently of the value of ρ. (Practically, our mathemat-
ical programming formulation coding the automated mechanism design problem
results to be infeasible.) In order to remove this impossibility, we need to remove
the constraint on ps,a,θ,r = ρ · b(θs,a).
4.2 Analyzing a Case Study
We consider a scenario where an integrator aggregates two domain-specific search
engines. The domain of the first search engine is music concerts, while the domain
of the second search engine is hotels. A demo of integrator can be found at [7].
We report the user interface of the demo in Fig. 1. We consider a simple example
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Fig. 1. An example of user interface of an integrator.
and we discuss the functioning of our mechanism (larger scenarios require long
time and cannot be solved in exact way in practical applications).
We assume that the user searches for:
– (on the first domain) a concert at Toronto at May 9-15 2010,
– (on the second domain) an hotel at Toronto for the same range of days.
We assume that the first domain-specific search engine returns three spon-
sored links. We report the Bayesian prior over them in Tab 1. We assume that
the second domain-specific search engine returns three sponsored links. We re-
port the Bayesian prior over them in Tab 2. We assume that the number of
available slots for sponsored links displayed by the integrator are two.
advertiser taxi service restaurant1 restaurant2
bid (b) 0.40 e 0.40 e 0.50 e 0.50 e 0.65 e 0.65 e 0.70 e 0.70 e 0.60 e 0.70 e
click probability (α) 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.030 0.040 0.050 0.040 0.050 0.035 0.035
type probability (ω) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.40 0.60
Table 1. Bayesian prior over the sponsored link list returned by the first domain-
specific search engine.
advertiser restaurant1 tourist office taxi service
bid (b) 0.50 e 0.50 e 0.60 e 0.60 e 0.25 e 0.35 e 0.20 e 0.20 e 0.30 e 0.30 e
click probability (α) 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.030 0.035 0.020 0.030 0.020 0.030
type probability (ω) 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Table 2. Bayesian prior over the sponsored link list returned by the second domain-
specific search engine.
We solved our automated mechanism design problem with Bayes-Nash imple-
mentation with the maximization of the integrator’s expected utility as objective
function. We report the results only for a small number of type profiles. Exactly,
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we consider the type profiles reported in Tab. 3. The results are reported in
Tab. 4, where fθ,r1 denotes the sponsored link displayed in the first position
and the search engine it belongs to, fθ,r2 is the same for the second position,
pθ,r1 denotes the payment of the search engine whose sponsored link is in the
first position once the user clicked on the link, pθ,r2 is the same for the second
position. All the other payments are equal to zero. It can be easily observed that
the advertiser taxi service is the one that gives both search engines, if singularly
considered, the smallest expected utility. Instead, considering the search engines
together, taxi service is displayed in the second position.
search engine 1 search engine 2
taxi service restaurant1 restaurant2 restaurant1 tourist office taxi service
θ b α b α b α b α b α b α
type profile 1 0.40 e 0.02 0.70 e 0.05 0.60 e 0.035 0.50 e 0.03 0.35 e 0.035 0.20 e 0.03
type profile 2 0.40 e 0.02 0.65 e 0.04 0.60 e 0.035 0.50 e 0.03 0.35 e 0.035 0.30 e 0.02
type profile 3 0.50 e 0.02 0.70 e 0.04 0.70 e 0.035 0.60 e 0.035 0.25 e 0.030 0.20 e 0.03
Table 3. Some type profiles.
θ fθ,r1 fθ,r2 pθ,r1 pθ,r2
type profile 1 restaurant1, search engine 1 taxi service, search engine 1 0.70 e 0.40 e
type profile 2 restaurant1, search engine 1 taxi service, search engine 1 0.65 e 0.30 e
type profile 3 restaurant1, search engine 1 taxi service, search engine 1 0.70 e 0.50 e
Table 4. Social choice function and payments.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
The recent advancements in search computing techniques lead to new search
paradigms according to which multiple domain-specific search engines are inte-
grated by a special search engine (called integrator). A user can enter a multi-
domain query, this query is decomposed by the integrator in a set of single-
domain query, each one of them is addressed to a specific-domain search engine.
The integrator merges the search results received from each specific-domain
search engine. This paradigm allows one to discover a large number of infor-
mation and to produce very precise search results with respect to the currently
available general purpose search engines. In this paper we made a first attempt
towards the design of an advertising auction mechanism for this scenario. More
precisely, we proposed a business model in which the domain-specific search en-
gines returns, in addition to the search results, a list of sponsored links to the
integrator and the integrator merges these lists in a unique list. In order to
produce an effective merging, the integrator must be informed about the click
probabilities and bids of the advertisers appearing in the lists. We resort to the
automated mechanism design framework to design an economic mechanism for
the scenario we study. We discuss its desired properties and we report some
examples.
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The automated mechanism design approach can be used for small problems,
but it does not scale for large real-world problem. This pushes for the develop-
ment of analytical mechanisms or of approximate algorithms. Furthermore, in
this paper we have not posed any cooperative constraint over the revenue shar-
ing. In future, our intention is to explore, on the one side, group strategy-proof
mechanisms, such as the Moulin’s mechanism and its extensions, and, on the
other side, two-stage mechanisms to address interdependence valuations.
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